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Abstract
Wealth inequality in Mexico has gained attention in recent years, with a public responding to eco-
nomic realities that precipitate less security and a more narrow horizon of opportunity for its citizens.
This paper examines 2016 MMSI data on a variety of mobility indicators to illuminate the mechanisms
that lead to better or worse socioeconomic outcomes, including by occupation, education and wealth.
The inequality of opportunity is used to indicate justifiable and unjustifiable disparities.
This paper addresses the current situation in Mexico, studying existing inequalities in wealth by
a variety of individual traits, as well as the opportunities for improvement of situation by education,
occupation, or wealth. Importantly, this work takes on a variety of measures from the specific per-
spective of skin colour based on the uniquely compelling feature of the PERLA survey for individual
self-identification, which builds on existing literature around pigmentocracy.
There is also evidence, among growing inequality, that the average Mexican is not aware of their true
socioeconomic positioning (61% of Mexicans reported being in the middle class but only 12% are), which
happens across the entire wealth distribution. Cross-sectional data is used to calculate measures that
show movement between 2 generations, parent and child, or a short-run mobility expectation. Absent
income data, a wealth index is also constructed based on reported presence of various material resources
in 2 generations. Notably, the effect of urbanicity is generally on par with skin color differences. There
is persistence at the extremes of the wealth distribution, indicating security for the wealthiest Mexicans,
and a consistent instability among the middle of distribution, where evidence suggests a high probability
to fall in their standing.
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1 Introduction
Why is social mobility important? When people from low-income families have little chance of moving up,
while those from well-off families are almost guaranteed to retain their privileged positions, we say that
the “social elevator” is broken. This can have harmful economic, social and political consequences.
Intergenerational social mobility refers to gains or losses in socioeconomic status between parents and
their children, it usually considers income or earnings, but it can also be measured in terms of education,
occupation or health. Relative social mobility considers people’s position on the social ladder comparing
their rank with that of their parents, whereas Absolute social mobility considers by how much the level
of a socioeconomic outcome has improved or deteriorated. As countries reach high levels of development,
progress in absolute mobility necessarily slows down.
For context, in Mexico’s neighboring United States, the last 40 years have seen the share of wealth
owned by the richest 1 percent doubled, the collective net worth of the bottom half has dropped to almost
zero; the median weekly pay for a full-time worker has increased by just 0.1 percent a year, and so on
(Andersen 2020).
Low social mobility can erode the foundations of economic growth, as a lack of upward mobility for
those at the bottom implies that many talents remain under-developed and that potentially profitable
investment opportunities go unexploited. A lack of downward mobility for those at the top promises
persistent rents for a few at the expense of the many, at high efficiency costs.
Mobility prospects are an important determinant of life satisfaction and well being, persons who gain
in socioeconomic status compared to their parents tend to fare better along a wide range of social and
well-being dimensions, such as civic participation, personal relationships or subjective well-being, than
those stuck at the bottom. Inversely, higher risks of downward mobility tend to reduce life satisfaction by
increasing perceived financial insecurity.
Opportunities also color the discussion on immigration, on the end of low-skilled individuals as well
as educated professionals. Mexico’s supply of educated individuals is growing almost five times faster
than overall population growth, and domestic opportunities are not expanding as quickly. This creates
an incentive for skilled Mexicans to migrate to the United States. Projections suggest that the domestic
supply of professionals will exceed demand until about 2025, after which demand will outstrip supply and a
shortfall of highly skilled individuals is likely to emerge. Until that point, emigration is a natural response
to the mobility situation for such individuals (Zúñiga and Molina 2008).
Mobility prospects also matter for social cohesion and democratic participation. Research suggests that
perceived equality of opportunities can reduce the likelihood of social conflict (OECD, 2018). Perspectives
of upward mobility weaken economic discontent, while more stagnant societies more easily give rise to
feelings of social exclusion. Low chances of upward mobility may reduce democratic participation, an
people facing the risk of downward mobility or status loss are less likely to feel that their voice counts.
This is associated with lower levels of trust in government.
Although there is nothing inevitable about socioeconomic privilege or disadvantage being passed from
one generation to another, large differences in mobility outcomes across countries indicate that there is
room for policies to make societies more mobile ad protect households from adverse income shocks. For
instance countries which in the past spent more on education or health tend to have higher educational
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or health mobility. What matters, however, is not only the overall level of public resources devoted to
education or health, but also their effective use and targeting to disadvantaged groups. Policy responses
should therefore not be confined to raising overall spending, but rather o targeting spending to effective
programmes.
According to Kuhn et al. (2018), historical data reveals that no progress has been made in reducing
income and wealth inequalities between black and white households over the past 70 years, and that close
to half of all American households have less wealth today in real terms than the median household had in
1970.
2 Literature Review
We will be focusing on three main issues: social mobility, inequality of opportunity and, moreover, pig-
mentocracy. In this section we will review some of the literature on this topics, both in Mexico and
elsewhere.
2.1 On social mobility
Social mobility is a widely discussed topic, as it is highly dependent on the overall structure of social
statuses and occupations in a given society (Grusky et al. 1984) and proved to be closely related to in-
come inequality (Schütz et al. 2008). Although generally accepted that some level of mobility in a society
is desirable, there is no consensus agreement upon ”how much” social mobility is good for or bad for a
society. Given that there is no international benchmark of social mobility, the literature on this topic aims
to compare measures of mobility across societies or groups.
Caballé (2016) reviewed different existing methods to measure social mobility, focusing on constructing
stochastic transition matrices1 from the data and then summarizing said matrices into a single number to
compare across cohorts, including relative mobility, average quantile movement and Shorrocks’ normalized
trace index. Other popular measures of social mobility that do not require constructing transition ma-
trices, are the intergenerational correlation (IC) and the intergenerational elasticity (IE). The first used
by Hertz et al. (2008) to estimate the IC of education attainment, where he found that the countries
presenting the most persistence are the ones in South America with an IC of 0.6, which can be attributed
to the existence of pervasive borrowing constraints to finance children’s education. He also found that the
Western European countries exhibit an IC of 0.4, which is even lover than that from Nordic countries, and
these lower numbers tend to be associated with the strength of the welfare state. The second measure, IE,
has been used in several studies such as those of Mazumder (2005), Nicoletti and Ermisch (2007), Blanden
et al. (2004) and Cervini-Plá (2015). Their results give values of the IE between 0.5 and 0.6 for the US,
0.3 for UK, 0.43 for Spain and 0.25 for Nordic countries2.
1As used in studies for the US (Isaacs 2007), Spain (Cervini-Plá 2011) and Sweden (Jäntti et al. 2006).
2Interested reader can consult the survey of Jäntti and Jenkins (2015), presenting the previous and other measures of
social mobility.
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Wilkinson and Pickett (2009), conducted an exhaustive analysis of social mobility in developed coun-
tries. In addition to other correlations with negative social outcomes for societies having high inequality,
they found a relationship between high social inequality and low social mobility. From the countries studied,
the US had both the highest economic inequality and lowest economic mobility. Another study comparing
social mobility between developed countries by Corak (2006), found that the four countries with the lowest
intergenerational income elasticity, i.e. the highest social mobility, were Denmark, Norway, Finland, and
Canada with less than 20% of advantages of having a high income parent passed on to their children.
The Economist also stated that ”evidence from social scientists suggests that American society is much
’stickier’ than most Americans assume. Some researchers (Mitnik et al. 2016) claim that social mobility
is actually declining.” In spite of this low mobility Americans have had the highest belief in meritocracy
among middle- and high-income countries (Isaacs 2008).
Piketty (2014) found that wealth-income ratios seem to be returning to very high levels in low economic
growth countries, similar to what he calls the ”classic patrimonial” wealth-based societies of the 19th
century wherein a minority lives off its wealth while the rest of the population works for subsistence living.
Social mobility can also be influenced by differences in education. The contribution of education to
social mobility often gets neglected in social mobility research although it really has the potential to trans-
form the relationship between origins and destinations (Brown et al. 2013). Recognizing the disparities
between strictly location and its educational opportunities highlights how patterns of educational mobility
are influencing the capacity for individuals to experience social mobility. There is some debate regarding
how important educational attainment is for social mobility. Literature by Bernardi et al. (2016) argued
that there is a direct effect of social origins which cannot be explained by educational attainment. However,
Sullivan et al. (2018) suggested that, using a sufficiently fine-grained measure of educational attainment,
taking on board such factors as university status and field of study, education fully mediates the link
between social origins and access to top class jobs.
In the Mexican context, a report published by Mexico City’s Centro de Estudios Espinosa Yglesias
(CEEY) on social mobility in the Mexican society. On the bright side, they say, there is a significant
amount of mobility in Mexico’s middle three economic quartiles. In contrast, few of the richest and the
poorest leave their origins behind, with a full 50% staying put on each end of the economic ladder.
In international comparisons, Mexico falls far behind industrialized countries, such as those in the Euro-
pean Union. But studies are more mixed when comparing Mexico to its Latin American neighbors. Ferreira
et al. (2013), from the World Bank, found Mexico to have one of the lowest proportions of upwardly-moving
social ”climbers” in Latin America, but another study (Calonico 2006) that tracks individuals over several
periods of time ranks Mexico’s mobility at the top of the region. Moreover, Angulo et al. (2012) from the
Universidad de los Andes found that while overall levels of mobility were higher in Chile, intergenerational
mobility was progressing much faster in Mexico than in either Chile or Colombia, for example.
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2.2 On inequality of opportunity
Philosopher John Rawls (Rawls, 1971) attempted to provide a moral theory alternative to utilitarianism
and addressed the problem of distributive justice (the socially just distribution of goods in a society). Also
on an early philosophical debate, when asked the question “What is equality?”, Dworkin (1981) argued
essentially that certain types of preferences should not elicit an egalitarian redistributive response.
Roemer (1998) addresses the question of how exactly to calibrate the effort of an individual, and argues
that the rank of an individual in the effort distribution across individuals with the same circumstances
should be the relevant metric. The central conceptual distinction of Roemer is to “separate the influences
on the outcome a person experiences into circumstances and effort: the former are attributes of a person’s
environment for which he should not be held responsible, and effort is the choice variable for which he
should be held responsible”
On more recent work, and applying Roemer’s concepts, Jusot et al. (2012) explored the importance of
the correlation between circumstances and effort and Torche (2014) explored these socioeconomic disparities
and their implications for mobility in the Latin American context.
2.3 On pigmentocracy
Pigmentocracy is a word used to explain the stratification of societies, mainly mixed-race, and how hier-
archies are created based on socio-racial structure and skin colour. According to Navarrete (2017), many
sociologists adopted the word to refer to the discrimination by skin colour prevalent in Mexico and Latin
America. According to the researcher, the success of the word lies in the fact that it encompasses and
strongly links the humiliations and prejudices that frame social inequalities and power differences, it en-
closes discrimination and social inequality between people only because of the colour of their skin, pointing
out that privileges are greater the lighter the colour of the skin. For the author, the true power of the
pigmentocracy concept is that it tries to ”naturalize inequality, make the marginalized invisible and exter-
minate them, convince us that the unacceptable is inevitable, get us used to inequity.”
Several studies have shown that in Latin America, a region where the ideologies of miscegenation have
denied the importance of race without, at the same time, erasing racism, a peculiar version of racism
without races, of identities without borders, has developed. Telles (2014) argues that culture in this re-
gion is hampered by not considering black and indigenous populations, and states that skin colour, rather
than ethno-racial labels, is the likely prism through which produces discrimination and, therefore, the best
variable to measure inequality. A specific set of survey questions asked whether respondents witnessed or
experienced identity-related discrimination, and identity was broken down into factors such as language,
social class, and skin colour. These questions do not measure actual events, but rather respondents’ percep-
tions of events, which is not easy in social settings characterized by silence and shame surrounding racism.
Among the most significant findings of the study is that, despite public of mixed-race ideologies, Latin
Americans continue to behave as if race were real, and race is substantially about skin colour, not about
social class, as it has been argued so often. For all the countries studied in the region, the correlations
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between skin colour and socioeconomic status show substantial advantages for lighter skin and very sig-
nificant disadvantages for darker skin. A favorable result was the fact that, although the minority among
the respondents agreed with a wide variety of explanations for the persistence of poverty, the majority
recognized that structural barriers were the main cause.
Another research (Sue, 2013) found that Mexicans reproduce the national ideology of their country’s
elites regarding skin colour even when it seems to harm them rather than benefit them. In the referred
work, which deals with racism, miscegenation and blackness, from a microcosmic perspective, Sue presents
the results of an ethnography carried out in two cities on the coast of Veracruz, Mexico, between 2003
and 2005, and talks about how people deal with these issues in a society in which, according to Sue, there
is a stratification by race and skin colour, and ”whiteness” is privileged. Sue points out that Veracruz
population speak easily in terms of colour; however, they are reluctant to do so in terms of race, since one
of the pillars of their ideology is that there is no racism in Mexico. She emphasizes that conversations
about colour are the opposite of conversations about race and in this way people allow themselves to escape
the accusations of racism in their entity. In her research, Sue found that a person can be categorized in
various ways at work, at home, etc., including skin colour, which makes racial identities very fluid and
hides discrimination based on this quality. The conceptual association between race and colour occurs when
there is a strong link in popular thought between terms that refer to race colour, socioeconomic status,
and physical attractiveness. For the people of Veracruz, for example, rich, handsome and white, are terms
that are associated. On the other hand, discursive slippage occurs when the association between words is
so strong that they are used as if they were interchangeable. Sue explores the racial identities of mestizos
and discovers that Veracruzanos of various skin tones have to distinguish aspects of their identities and
negotiate issues such as racial ideologies, nation-building, or national identity formation. Those furthest
from the prototype of the mestizo due to the lightness or darkness of their skin must adopt strategies to
reaffirm their national identities; however, although they choose parts of the national ideology, they do not
accept it completely.
The author also analyzes the attitudes of mestizos in interracial relationships. She exposes that mestizos
are not opposed to interracial marriages, however, they establish limits: they impose great demands to
marry those with darker skin, they object to cultural aspects regarding black and indigenous persons,
they show their preference for interracial marriages when it comes of light-skinned people, etc. The
contradictions between these attitudes and the ideology of miscegenation that Veracruz citizens must
assume are evident. Also, behaviors differ according to skin tone. Darker-skinned mestizos see this type
of relationship as a way to “whiten” themselves, to “improve the race”, while those with lighter-coloured
skin try to avoid associating with people of darker colour. In conclusion, the Veracruz people of the cities
under study affirm in the collective that there is no racism in Mexico, that there is no difference in the
treatment of people according to their skin colour, but when analyzing their ideology in small and intimate
social units, often in families, the discrimination by race and colour described above is observed. As a
community, Veracruz is not aware of the discrimination of which is victim due to its skin tone.
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3 The Data
The data we use comes from the Intergenerational Social Mobility Module 2016 (MMSI) conducted by
Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). This module is a survey representative
to all the Mexican population between 25 and 64 years of age. The data set contains information for 25,384
households and 42,705 individuals, which represents the 61,827,459 individuals between said age range in
the country.
It is designed to capture sociodemographic and socioeconomic information from the population, which
allows us to compare the origin and destination of the individuals in three dimensions: education, oc-
cupation, and economic. Given that the module is aimed specifically at measuring social mobility, the
questionnaire asks the target individuals not only about their current circumstances, but also about the
characteristics of their household of origin3 and their parents’ education and occupation levels.
Additionally, the survey included a colour palette designed to allow the self-identification of the re-
spondent’s skin tone. The palette corresponds to the tone categorization designed for the Project on Race
and Ethnicity in Latin America (PERLA). Using the captured information on skin tone self-assessment,
along with the other circumstances and characteristics aforementioned, we should be able to scrutinize on
weather if skin tone is a relevant circumstance in determining an individual’s access to advantages in life
in societies where skin colour is among the dimensions of social stratification.
4 Wealth Index
There are several ways in which wealth, economic status of households and living standards can be mea-
sured. Income, expenditure and consumption are three common measurements. Nevertheless, one of the
limitations of the MMSI Survey is that it does not capture any of these, and it is usually the key dimension
when talking about mobility and inequality. One immediate solution to this could be using the perceived
(self-assessed) socioeconomic status, which is a question included in the survey, yet the mismatch between
real and perceived socioeconomic status leads to impossibility in using this metric. In a striking article
published in July 2020 by the New York Times,Viri Rios writes,
“61 percent of the population identified as middle class but only 12 percent is. Half of the
country lives with a serious misunderstanding about their income level, confusion shared by
rich and poor alike. Mexicans who earn 120,000 pesos a month, for example, believe that they
have an ’average’ salary when in fact they earn more than 90% of the country.”
An alternative solution for this, in order to make a more precise assessment of socioeconomic status, is
to use the variables in the dataset on asset ownership and housing characteristics and combine this infor-
mation into a proxy indicator such as the wealth index, which we create by performing principal component
analysis (PCA). The advantage of a wealth index like this one is that asset ownership gives an indication
3This is when the respondent was 14 years old, so that temporal reference is not the same for all individuals.
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of the longer-term economic status of a household and is less dependent on short-term economic changes
compared with other wealth or poverty measures. As in a 2018 article ”Income and Wealth Inequality
in America, 1949-2016” by Moritz Kuhn et al. makes distinctions of class specifically hinging on asset
ownership with household-level archival U.S. data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, arguing that
portfolio composition and asset prices, rather than income or occupation, are the defining features of class
in the contemporary economic landscape. For this reason and others, it is justified to look at the material
circumstances and ownership of the Mexican population rather than the basic analysis of education, occu-
pation, or income as indicators of class and mobility.
One important note to keep in mind is that the wealth index measures relative wealth and, unlike a
poverty line based on income, is not an absolute measure of poverty or wealth. When referring to the
wealth of households based on the wealth index we can talk about poorer and wealthier households but
we cannot conclude who is absolutely poor and wealthy. When dividing the population into wealth index
quintiles, we are splitting up the whole population into five equally large groups, based on their wealth
rank. This means that, for example, in a region where only 10% of households fall below the poverty line,
40% of households will still fall into the two poorest quintiles and therefore be classified as the poorest.
4.1 Variable selection for wealth index
The asset ownership variables selected for the construction of the wealth indices are the following:
Table 1: Welath Index - Variables
Productive Assets Non-Productive Assets Household utilities and other
Land for agricultire Blender Bank account
Livestock Car Cedit card
Second house Cellphone Crowding








Several notes should be made on the selection of variables in the data set to contribute to the index.
While including more variables leads the model to have more explanatory power for the variance of out-
comes, it consequently follows that less importance will be granted to any individual elements found to
have significant influence in the PCA.
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Consider the impact of one factor - domestic service hired by households. Due to Mexico’s demo-
graphic status and overpopulation, many choose to participate in the labor force in flexible and direct
service to other households like construction or domestic work; the supply of labor drives down the price
and makes it more widely accessible. As a result, it is much more common to encounter middle-income
families employing domestic workers than a similarly positioned household in other countries, or economies.
Another variable indicated by the data is the presence of technology, which is obviously an evolving
target as the complexity and availability of technology grows and progresses each year. Intuitively, a 45-
year-old individual may be in the middle class in their origin household at age 14 and similarly at the
current age of 45; however, while it was very unreasonable to expect a computer or mobile phone to be
considered standard in 1989, rapid computing advances and market spread/saturation have made these
more likely to be fixtures in a middle class household in 2020. Mobile phones in particular enjoy widespread
popularity globally even among low-income households in the global South due to decentralized networks.
In the data, technological assets like appliances have a very high correlation with the index overall, in
fact contributing more than access to utilities like electricity or consumables like meat. Analyzing the ori-
gin household data, technology has less effect, per the temporal nature of technological progress explained
earlier, whereas these variables become much more important in the present-day household. In fact, the
younger/current generation using these widespread mobile technologies proves that whichever households
are ”left behind” have a true lag in socioeconomic privilege; therefore, the presence of appliances and tech-
nology (especially mobile, internet and computers) have a much higher correlation with the index when
performing the PCA. The internet in particular is a highly indicative variable: while it is hardly significant
in the household of origin, its presence accounts for the top indicator that tracks with the wealth index
movement in the current household. Therefore, we can look to access to the internet as the key vehicle of
mobility.
Lastly, the tests used to indicate the suitability of the index are the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure
of Sampling Adequacy (KMO), which indicates the proportion of variance in the variables selected that
might be caused by underlying factors4; and Bartlett’s test of sphericity, which tests the hypothesis that
the correlation matrix is an identity matrix, which would indicate that the variables are unrelated and
therefore unsuitable for structure detection. Both of the indices, parent and child wealth, yielded optimal
values for the KMO test5, 0.928 and 0.888 respectively, while also being statistically significant by the
Bartlett’s test6. Full results of the PCA can be found in the appendix.
4Values closer to 1.0 generally indicate that the results of the factor analysis are useful for the data.
5Typically, if the value is less than 0.50, the results of the factor analysis probably won’t be very useful.
6Approx. Chi-squared significance level of less than 0.05
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5 Descriptives
Before getting into the analysis of social mobility and inequality of opportunity we will take a look at some
important descriptives to better understand the distribution of the population. We will look at the general
overview of the population as well as the skin tone grouping from the Perla color palette. Specifically
comparing the three dimensions for the analysis with the skin tone distribution we hope to get an initial
idea on if there are some perceived significant differences amongst individuals belonging to different skin
tone groups and their outcomes.
5.1 Population overview
Figure 1: Basic population distribution
In Figure 1 it’s shown the most general overview of the Mexican population between 25 and 64. As men-
tioned before the total number of individuals in the data set is around 62 million from which 47% are
men and 53% women. The population pyramid shows the majority of the population is between 25 and
40 years of age, with a larger portion of the young population being women. Also relevant for the analysis
of mobility and inequality is the distribution between urban and rural areas, which in the Mexican case
is 79% of individuals living in urban locations while the remaining 21% lives in rural areas7. Additionally
only 9% of the population reported to have at least one parent that speaks in indigenous tongue.
7An area is defined as rural if it has a population under 2,500 people.
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Moving forward with the analysis we will divide the calculations conditioning on the self-assessed skin
color, so it is important to know how the population is distributed. Given that the PERLA color palette
is comprised of 11 different skin tones, we grouped them into three categories: light skin (tones 1 through
3), medium skin (tones 4 and 5) and dark skin (tones 6 through 11), the same grouping Edward Telles and
PERLA use in their book Pigmentocracy. Figure 2 shows the distribution for the 11 categories and the
three groups. The majority of the population fall into the medium skin tone group with 67%, then 21% in
the dark skin group and only 12% in the light skin group.
Figure 2: Skin tone distribution
5.2 Socioeconomic variables and skin tone distribution
After looking at the overall distribution of the population, it is important to understand the distribution
of the socioeconomic variables under study as across the skin tone palette, as to get an initial intuition of
the pigmentocracy existing in the country. For this we proceed to display the distributions of education,
occupation and the wealth index as heat maps, to visualize how each of these three dimensions behave
with respect to self-assessed skin colour.
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Figure 3: Education level and skin tone distribution
Starting with education, Figure 3 shows that the average school level completed regardless of skin
tone is Secondary. The heat map also reveals that there is a tendency showing that there is a difference
between individuals’ education attainment as skin tone changes. For those in the darker tones there is a
much higher concentration in the some primary category and very few individuals above the average level,
whereas for those with the lighter tones the higher concentration is in the higher education level with very
few individuals below the average.
In fact, less than 10% of the individuals in the darker tones reach the higher education level whereas
for those in the lighter tones it is 26%. For people in the medium-tones these number falls in between, at
22%. Surprisingly a third of the Mexican population between 25 and 64 have reached only secondary or
middle school.
Then, to obtain the distribution displayed in Figure 4, for the occupation level of the individuals first
we have to determine an order for the levels, as this is not an obvious ordinal variable, i.e. the occupation
categories do not follow a particular order from worst to best. This order is usually determined in terms of
the average income of the individuals in each of the occupation groups. In this case, and throughout the
rest of the analysis, it will be classified in the same way as INEGI does in the survey module documentation.
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Looking at the heat map in Figure 4 we see that there is a clear tendency for those in the lighter tones
to have higher ranked jobs, i.e. officials or directors, whereas the bulk of the population in the darker
tones are in the elementary and support activities category. Also looking at the agriculture, farming, and
fishing occupations we see that there is a negligible proportion of individuals with medium and light skin
in these kind of jobs and almost all of this segment is comprised by darker skin tone individuals. People
in the medium tones are almost equally distributed amongst the top two and bottom two categories, with
22% into former and 21% in the latter.
Figure 4: Occupation level and skin tone distribution
Finally, we take look at the distribution of the wealth index amongst the population. The population
is grouped into wealth index quintiles for easier and more intuitive conclusions, as this allows us to talk
about the richer class (fifth quintile), upper middle class (fourth), middle class (third), lower middle class
(second) and poorer class (first quintile).
The heat map in Figure 5 shows that the vast majority of people in poverty are concentrated in
the darker tones, while almost none of them are in the middle class and up. While the rest of the
population is more equally distributed amongst the quintiles in the medium and lighter skin tones, there is
a slight concentration around the middle class in the medium tones, as well as a somewhat more noticeable
concentration of individuals with light skin in the top quintiles.
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Figure 5: Wealth quintile and skin tone distribution
6 Social Mobility
The following section analyses the data to understand the degree of social mobility in the population and
among different groups. Here we will take a deeper look at the differences in mobility probabilities for
individuals in different skin tone groups to determine to what extend the concept of pigmentocracy prevails
in Mexico.
To empirically measure intergenerational social mobility, first we need to create a stochastic transition
matrix for an economic variable, where the values of the variable under study are divided in class intervals
so that each value pij of the matrix P gives us the relative conditional frequency that the value of the
relevant variable for the child lies in the bin j given that the value of the same variable for his parent
lies in the bin i. This means that a transition probability matrix with the values concentrated around the
diagonal will be a signal of persistence (or immobility).
As an additional analysis, we compute two of the measures for mobility matrices reviewed by Caballé
(2016) and first proposed by Shorrocks (1978) in order to summarize all the information contained in the
transition matrices into a single number (index) that can be easily compared. Although these indices result
in a severe loss of information and one should always analyse the matrices as a whole, they still provide a
baseline for comparison to other groups within the population. The first measure results in an indicator
for relative mobility, which considers the level of a socioeconomic outcome improvement or deterioration;
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the second indicates absolute mobility, which considers someone’s position on the social ladder comparing
their rank with that of their parents.
Relative mobility is calculated by first computing the eigenvalues of the particular matrix, and then
taking the difference between the second largest eigenvalue and 1. The second largest eigenvalue is used for
calculation because the largest, in a transition matrix, the largest is always one. Calculating the relative
mobility implicit in a given transition matrix this way is similar to considering the ”distance” of the par-
ticular matrix with respect to the identity matrix. These results indicate only if there is more movement
in one matrix or another, however it does not capture the direction of said moves.
Then, absolute mobility is calculated using the Average Quantile Movement (AQM), which is simply
the sum of the transition probabilities weighted by the jump in the number of quantiles between parents








First mobility is analyzed in terms of occupation, as it is a qualitative variable and categories are not
necessarily ordered, so the analysis of mobility between groups is not as straightforward. The transition
matrix for the occupations for the national population is shown in Figure 6. It is possible to see that
those whose parents work in elementary and support activities have a 37% probability that they will
do the same, whereas individuals whose parents are officials and directors have a 52% probability to end
up working in the same level. On this level, the access to managerial positions can be seen as an inheritance.
Even though certain occupation levels empirically imply higher income associated to them, policymakers
cannot say that one level is better than another in absolute terms, and diversification or balance across
all categories is more justifiable and necessary than in other social measures like wealth. A population of
only CEOs, for example, is not close to being ideal and the population should be distributed amongst the
different sectors of the economy to be sustainable.
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Figure 6: Transition matrix for occupation
However, as the previous matrix is time independent, we can easily compute its associated ergodic
stochastic probability vector, which is the vector of frequencies of the different occupations in the long
run. It is independent of the initial distribution of frequencies. That being the case, from the previous
transition matrix of occupations we compute the following distribution of the occupational categories in
the long run:













0.21 0.18 0.04 0.08 0.22 0.26
In the vector we see that in Mexico, in the long run, will have over a quarter of the population working
as officials, directors and chiefs considering current mobility. Comparably, only 4% of the population will
work in agriculture, forestry and fishing - hardly an appropriate proportion for the amount of agricultural
production of the country. This measure can be used by policymakers to implement policies to incentivize
a sector of the economy in step with longer term development plans and projections.
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6.2 Education
Next, reviewing the results on education is relevant because education attainment provides one of the
most promising chances of upward social mobility, regardless of current social standing. However, the
intense stratification of social classes and high wealth inequality in Mexico directly affects the educational
opportunities people are able to obtain, and therefore limits their chances for upward social mobility. In
other words, social class and a family’s socioeconomic status directly affect a child’s chances for obtaining
a quality education and succeeding in life. Studies have found that by age five, there are significant de-
velopmental differences between low, middle, and upper class children’s cognitive and non-cognitive skills
(Greenstone et al. 2016). In contrast to the previous analysis, these are ordered categories in which higher
education level is in fact a desired outcome.
This type of analysis can also be used by policymakers to implement various policies that could take
the form of universal provision of public education (currently it is provided but not accessible or considered
quality in many areas), remove the borrowing constraints that prevent the investment in skill acquisition
courses, tax reforms favoring families dealing with educational debt, or other programs of educational
financial aid. In Figure 6 we can see the transition matrices for education mobility8 for the whole population
and then disaggregation by urbanicity and skin color group9.
Figure 7: Transition matrices for parent to child education
8HE= ”Higher education”, HS= ”High school”, S= ”Secondary”, P= ”Primary”, SP= ”Some primary”
9Less than primary is aggregated with some primary for the analysis.
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For the general population, we observe that there is a very high degree of stickiness in the higher
education level: children of parents with a higher education have 73% probability of achieving this level.
The lower level of education, some primary, is less sticky at the bottom, with only 21% probability of
children achieving this education level if their parents did; in fact, the highest probable outcome for these
individuals is to reach secondary level (the population average). Also, individuals whose parents achieved
secondary have 35% chance to reach higher education, and 29% chance of remaining in the secondary ed-
ucation level. It is interesting to note that, for parents with a higher education, there is a 0% probability
that their children will fall to the lowest degree of educational attainment.
When conditioning on urbanicity, the probabilities vary quite a bit. The bottom level for those in rural
areas is more persistent than the national average, at 32% probability of staying in that level, whereas
the probability of going from some primary all the way to higher education is only 3%. Individuals living
in urban areas have half the probability (16%) of remaining at the bottom and a 12% chance of going
all the way to the top, four times more than those in rural areas. In both cases, upward mobility in the
two highest levels of education and the stickiness of the top level is high. Even so, the probability of an
individual achieving higher education given that their parent did is 9% less in rural areas as compared to
urban areas.
Looking at the differences between skin color groups in Figure 7, we see that for light-skinned people
whose parent reached the secondary level, the most likely outcome is to attain higher education, whereas
for those in the dark skin group the most likely outcome is to remain in the secondary education level.
Differences in the top level are minimal as all three skin tone groups have between 73% and 77% chances
of remaining in the top level, similar to the national average. The chances of achieving higher education
for dark-skinned people is notably less at any level, though the difference by skin tone group is more
pronounced in the middle levels than in the extremes. Therefore, when considering education, living in a
rural area can be seen as a much stronger conditioning factor than skin tone.
Summarizing the information of the matrices demonstrating these measures of mobility, the relative
mobility for the national population is 0.63 and then, for rural and urban configurations, 0.58 and 0.66
respectively. The light skin matrix has a relative mobility of 0.68, medium skin 0.65 and dark skin 0.56.
These numbers give us further confirmation that rural areas have less mobility than those urban areas, and
that lighter skin individuals are presented with higher chances of moving than darker skin individuals.
Measuring absolute mobility with the AQM yields the following results: 1.11 (national), 0.97 (rural),
1.15 (urban), 1.10 (light skin), 1.14 (medium skin), 1.01 (dark skin). It can be inferred that population
density in cities leads to opportunity presence, and other mechanisms should be named to justify differences
by skin tone. Results indicate that, if mobility happens, an individual in the dark skin group would expect




Lastly, we will take an in-depth look at mobility in terms of wealth. We will use the origin and current
wealth indices constructed and divide the population into five equal bins or quintiles. As mentioned before,
the most salient economic variable to measure social mobility is wealth, so in this case we make a more
thorough analysis than that which was made for occupation and education.
Mobility opportunities in Mexico are very low. Persistence of poverty is extreme: almost half of the
Mexicans born in the bottom fifth of the wealth scale remain there. If there were no ”initial advantages” or
inequality was not inherited, the probability of getting to the top quintile while being born in the bottom
one would be 20%, but is far from it, in fact, it is nearly impossible at only 3%. Using data from the
Brookings Institution, we compare this to other countries and get that this probability in the US is 7% and
9% in the UK. Developed countries have more than four times the probability of Mexico, like Denmark at
12% or Canada at 14%.
Similar to previous figures, Figure 8 shows the transition matrices from origin wealth quintile to current
wealth quintile, divided by population groups.
Figure 8: Transition matrices for origin to current wealth
The matrices provide some expected results after the intuition gained from the wealth heat map seen
before, and some interesting, less expected results as well.
There is a notable result when looking at the middle class: the probability of remaining in the middle
quintile is the same as that of falling to the poorer quintile, at 26%. The national transition matrix shows
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the current middle class crisis10, it is shrinking and inequality is growing. Those in middle class are very
likely to become poorer, those that are poor have little chance of overcoming poverty, with only 16% chance
of reaching middle class, and rich individuals are almost guaranteed to remain rich, having 15% probability
of falling to the middle class.
Nonetheless, this middle class crisis is not the same for all. The difference between groups is remarkable.
For instance, individuals from rural areas that grew up in middle-quintile families have 34% probability of
falling to the second quintile and 29% of going all the way to the poorest quintile, meanwhile the chance of
remaining in the middle quintile is only 23%. Even for those coming from upper middle class households,
it is more likely to fall to the lower middle class (32%) than to remain in the fourth quintile (16%).
Skin tone group disaggregation shows that white middle-class individuals are most likely to remain in
the middle class with a probability of 33%, and the second most likely outcome is to go up the scale with
25% chance of reaching the fourth quintile. The situation is not the same for darker-skinned individuals
as they have a 34% probability of falling into the lower middle class compared to 23% of maintaining their
middle class status.
Then, applying the measures for relative mobility, we get that for the national population it is 0.57,
for rural configurations 0.53 and urban areas 0.60. The light skin matrix has a relative mobility of 0.62,
medium skin 0.69 and dark skin 0.56. Again, we see more evidence of rural areas having less mobility
opportunities than urban areas and that lighter skin yields higher chances of moving, although in this case
medium skin has the highest relative mobility.
Applying the AQM gives us the following results: 1.01 (national), 0.95 (rural), 1.04 (urban), 0.91 (light
skin), 0.97 (medium skin), 0.97 (dark skin). Urbanicity again shows difference in opportunities, although
not as much as in terms of education. Comparing skin tone groups, results indicate that jumps in wealth
are slightly larger for medium and dark skin tones than for lighter skin individuals. However, as it is shown
next, this is due to greater jumps downwards for those medium and dark skin groups.
Probably the most relevant metric to assess mobility is directional mobility, which is taking the prob-
abilities of a given transition matrix and focusing on the probability of moving up the scale or down the
scale. Upward mobility is the probability that individuals at the bottom of the wealth distribution have
to move towards the top, i.e. to get out of the bottom quintile and overcome poverty. The opposite case
would be downward mobility and it is important to examine as it shows wealth persistence. Directional
mobility is not only a simpler, more intuitive way to identify the differences between population groups, but
also the way it is most perceived by the population. As described by the OECD: people are increasingly
concerned about their ability to improve their financial situation over the life course, and the perceived
risk of ”sliding down the social ladder” is also increasing across countries.
Figure 9 shows the directional mobility for the Mexican population. Upward mobility is calculated as
10The OECD calculates that real, disposable income for the middle class has not grown since the middle of last decade,
while that for the top 10% is hitting new highs.
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the probability of getting out of the poorest quintile, regardless of the end position in the distribution and,
similarly, downward mobility is the probability of moving down from the top quintile.
Figure 9: Upward (from the bottom) and downward (from the top) mobility
The results for the national population show that the chances of moving up are ever so slightly better
than those of moving down, 52% and 50% respectively. The more relevant results are those of comparing
the population groups, as we see clear evidence of conditioning factors. First of all, the population of
rural areas have much lower opportunities of moving up at 34%, but the most striking result is that the
persistence of wealth is very low, as rich individuals in rural configurations have more than 70% probability
of moving down the wealth distribution. In urban regions the case is almost the opposite, as the chances
of moving out of poverty are 70% while those of staying at the richest portion of the population is almost
the same than the national average at 49%.
The evidence confirming the existence of pigmentocracy is also very clear. Figure 9 shows that the
expectations of moving out of poverty are 15 percentage points lower for individuals in the dark skin tone
group. Not only do lighter skin signifies better outcomes, but also the continuity of them. Downward
mobility is the same as the national average for the medium skin tone group (50%), whereas lighter skin
individuals have only 43% probability of losing their wealth. In the case of dark skin individuals the prob-
ability of moving down is 60%, i.e. 40% more than those with lighter skin. People with darker skin have
not only a harder path to overcome poverty, but also a more difficult time trying to maintain their wealth
when at the top.
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The works of Raj Chetty (2014), an economist in Harvard and expert in social mobility, allows us
to also compare centile to centile. Figure 10 shows mobility by percentile (from the poorest 1% to the
richest 1%). In a country where parent’s wealth had no influence on their children’s wealth, we would see
a straight horizontal line, but that is not the case. Individual’s who grew up in poor households are now
under the median wealth, whereas those coming from rich households much more opportunities to end up
in the richest portion of the population.
In the US, for example, children of households in the 10th centile end up on average in centile 34, while
those in Denmark or Canada go all the way to centile 42. In Mexico, they reach on average the 30th
centile. With rich households, of course, the opposite occurs: rich households, 90th centile, in the US see
their children reach on average centile 67, Denmark and Canada get to the 57th and, in Mexico, the end
up around the 60th centile.
Figure 10: Average wealth conditioned on parent’s wealth
As we have seen so far, parent’s wealth is very significant, forasmuch as individuals’ wealth will largely
depend on their household of origin’s wealth, but not only that, another key factor is the region in which
they live, as growing up in different states proves to be relevant to determine wealth mobility.
In Figure 11 we see mobility by centile for the nine largest states by population, compared to the
national average in grey. The differences amongst different states is huge. The percentage of children of
poor families that grew up to become rich is much higher in states like Nuevo León (40%), Mexico City
(32%) and Jalisco (27%) than in Puebla (10%), Michoacán (9%), or Coahuila (4%), for example, and this
differences are clearly evidenced in Figure 11 when comparing to national mobility. States like Mexico
State, Veracruz and Guanajuato experience wealth mobility much closer to the national average.
25
Figure 11: Average wealth conditioned on parent’s wealth - State comparison
7 Inequality of Opportunity
In this section we make an assessment on inequality of opportunity, the aim is to determine which factors
affect outcome in terms of wealth.
The core premise of equality of opportunity is the idea that inequalities in outcomes can be partitioned
into justifiable (or legitimate) sources of inequality, resulting from unequal individual effort and luck and
unjustifiable (or illegitimate) sources, resulting from circumstances beyond the individual’s control. Ap-
plications all rely on the assumption that effort and circumstances can indeed be separated, which takes
assumptions of causality and some loss of information. While the separation of concepts is clear in princi-
ple, there is a question of whether they can ever be separated in practice, or even conceptually.
Here, the method aims to understand the predictive power of exclusively circumstantial factors versus
assumed effort. Note that other mechanisms that account for such outcomes can still hold power at the
meta level; that is, a prediction for an individual’s sorting into an outcome will not inherently be explained
by the characteristic circumstance or the effort; this is why theory is crucial to inference in the given case.
Still, we proceed on the sound basis that larger inequalities based on circumstance indicate more severely
unjustifiable inequalities.
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In the literature11 this is made by using the rank-rank regression approach described by Dahl and
DeLeire (2008), and it has been already discussed with the Mexican case using the MMSI 2016 data set
in a paper by Monroy-Gómez-Franco, Vélez and Yalonetzky (2018), where they show that there is a high
degree of intergenerational persistence in terms of positions on the household wealth distribution.
In our analysis, however, we take a different approach. We aim to apply the machine learning clas-
sification algorithm of proportional odds logistic regression, which is useful to predict multi-class ordered
variables such as the wealth index quintiles created previously.
7.1 The model
Ordinal logistic regression builds off of the idea of binary logistic regression: that is, taking a probability,
transform it into odds, taking the log of that value and conducting a regression on that transformed value.
However, ordinal regression requires thinking of cumulative probabilities instead of individual categorical
probabilities. We have to assume that one makes it to one particular category and then we know the
probability of being in that category or having been in any category lower.
First is the cumulative probability. Assuming we take our categorical dependent variable, and label
it from 1 to J (J categories), the probability of reaching category j would be defined by the cumulative
probability,
Fj(xi) = P (Yi ≤ j|xi)
then, we take that probability, transform it to odds and taking logarithms gives us the logit (stochastic
component),




to which we add an observation mechanism (τ cuts)
Yi = j if τj−1 ≤ Y ∗i ≤ τj for j = 1, ..., J
then, the multiple regression model to fit is:
Y ∗ = αj − β1x1 − β2x2 − ...− βkxk
where there will be J − 1 equations in total, as the probability of being in at least the last category is
1.
Lastly, to make sense of the results, a systematic component relating the coefficients and the τ cuts has
to be used. This component has the form of
Pr(Y ≤ j) = Pr(Y ∗ ≤ τj) =
exp(τj − xiβ)
1 + exp(τj − xiβ)





1 + exp(τj − xiβ)
−
exp(τj−1 − xiβ)
1 + exp(τj−1 − xiβ)
To assess inequality of opportunity, in this case, we will be focusing on the effect of circumstances on
wealth outcomes, as to empirically get a sense of the unjustifiable inequalities. For this, the explanatory
variables (set of circumstances) used to fit the model are parent wealth, parent education, parent occupation,
skin tone, urbanicity, gender and parent speaks indigenous tongue12. It should be noted that fitting this
kind of model generates only a t value, but we can generate an estimate for a traditional p value by
comparing it against the standard normal distribution.
Table 3: Ordered Logistic Regression - Results
Coefficients: Value Std. Error t value p value
Parent wealth 0.50911 0.012610 40.3719 0.000
Parent education 0.15849 0.013891 11.4094 0.000
Parent occupation 0.11968 0.009517 12.5754 0.000
Skin tone -0.26059 0.024547 -10.6160 0.000
Urbanicity 1.21167 0.036068 33.5938 0.000
Gender 0.04751 0.027440 1.7314 0.083
Indigenous tongue -0.66956 0.044287 -15.1186 0.000
τ cuts: Value Std. Error t value p value
1Q - 2Q 0.4789 0.0998 4.8010 0.000
2Q - 3Q 1.8750 0.1002 18.7130 0.000
3Q - 4Q 3.0952 0.1017 30.4237 0.000
4Q - 5Q 4.3847 0.1042 42.0858 0.000
Looking at the results we see that, as expected, parent’s wealth, education and occupation have positive
impact on the individual’s wealth outcome; the most notable is the impact of urbanicity, where living in a
denser area positively impacts wealth quintile outcome, almost twice as much as speaking an indigenous
tongue harms it. From these two values, we can infer a link between the concentration of wealth and/or
opportunity available to individuals gravitating to urban life. Parent wealth predictably indicates higher
wealth outcomes, which tracks with the persistence and so-called inherited security from past results. We
also get that the coefficient for skin tone group is negative, giving us the indication that darker skin tones
have a negative impact on wealth. All the coefficients, except for gender, are statistically significant. This
is a very surprising result as, in the field of labor economics, models that use income as the latent variable
do tend to reveal the presence of a gender gap as significant.
12Dummy variables for states were included to capture the differences in regions separate from the set of circumstances.
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To interpret results of the model, we calculate expected and predicted values for the probability of being
in each wealth quintile given the set of circumstances of the individual by simulating the outcomes with
the fitted model. First, the predicted probabilities are drawn from the logit distribution described by µi, or
the mean value of the covariates, and observed as one of the J discrete outcomes. Figure 12 shows that
these calculations based on the sample means are slightly weighted toward the lower end, with quintiles
two and three (middle and lower middle class) being more probable for the average Mexican citizen.
Figure 12: Predicted probabilities for µi
Then, the expected probabilities are the simulations of the predicted probabilities for each category:
E(Y = j) = πj given a draw of β from its sampling distribution (i.e. around µi). This gives us the empirical
distribution of the expected probabilities of being in each wealth quintile for the average Mexican in Table
4. Following intuition, there is less probability for either extreme (landing in the first or fifth quintile) for
the average citizen, with balanced middle quintiles.
Table 4: Distribution of the expected probabilities
Quintile Probability Std. Error Lower (2.5%) Upper (97.5%)
1Q 0.131 0.008 0.116 0.147
2Q 0.250 0.034 0.190 0.325
3Q 0.293 0.024 0.243 0.334
4Q 0.204 0.019 0.158 0.233
5Q 0.122 0.041 0.052 0.211
The following Figure 13 illustrates this empirical distribution for each wealth quintile, which allows to
show that the fifth quintile (presented in the first row) is as a much flatter, dispersed distribution. This
distribution of probabilities (to land in the top quintile) is spread out so that predicting a rich outcome
proves to be more challenging than predicting a poor outcome. It results more likely to consistently predict
a poor outcome, as indicated by the lower standard error (0.008) of the expected probability, indicating a
more consistent estimation in the lowest row.
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Figure 13: Distribution of the expected probabilities
7.2 Inequality: first differences
This is done by simulating the predicted and expected probabilities for a fixed value of x and x1 of one of
the explanatory variables. Then calculating the difference in each of the probabilities by
Pr(Y = j|x1)− Pr(Y = j|x) for j = 1, ...J
7.2.1 By parent’s wealth
This lets us see how parent’s wealth affects the wealth outcome for the individuals: that is, if the rich
remain rich and poor remain poor. For this, we fix x as parent’s wealth in the lower quintile, and x1 as
parents being in the top wealth quintile. Running numerous simulations allows us to scale much larger
than the given sample of the data, while still taking draws of the other covariates considering their sample
distributions per the logit model. The results of the simulation with 10,000 iterations are as follows:
Figure 14: Predicted and expected probabilities, top and bottom origin wealth
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The red portion indicates those starting in the lowest quintile, and their most probably outcome is to
remain in the lowest quintile, evident by the leftmost column. On the blue portion, those in the highest
quintile can expect by a large probability to remain in the highest or, very closely, the second-highest
quintile. Notice those with fixed value of starting in the first quintile have consistently less probability to
move to their opposite extreme.
Table 5 below shows the probabilities of ending up in each of five wealth quintiles based on the fixed
variable being parent’s wealth in the bottom quintile or the top quintile, and then isolates just the differences
between those probabilities in the last section. By doing so, we isolate the effect of starting in a particular
quintile and looking at the differences in movement across an entire distribution. Earlier analysis of the
transition matrices was a snapshot in time of the real wealth outcomes intergenerationally. So, it can
be said that the first differences approach brings into focus the nature of the inequality specifically by
simulating the generalized log odds, rather than just reported wealth differences.
Table 5: Expected probabilities, fixed origin quintiles and first differences
Quintile Probability Std. Error Lower (2.5%) Upper (97.5%)
Parents Wealth: Bottom Quintile
Q1 0.333 0.007 0.319 0.346
Q2 0.327 0.022 0.285 0.369
Q3 0.204 0.005 0.195 0.213
Q4 0.093 0.011 0.072 0.114
Q5 0.043 0.012 0.024 0.070
Parents Wealth: Top Quintile
Q1 0.051 0.002 0.048 0.055
Q2 0.123 0.014 0.098 0.153
Q3 0.238 0.030 0.181 0.296
Q4 0.299 0.015 0.265 0.321
Q5 0.287 0.056 0.189 0.400
First Differences
Q1 -0.282 0.007 -0.296 -0.267
Q2 -0.204 0.009 -0.219 -0.185
Q3 0.034 0.031 -0.022 0.098
Q4 0.207 0.024 0.153 0.242
Q5 0.245 0.044 0.164 0.332
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As we see, the differences (considering their absolute values) are most pronounced in the extrema, with
a greater difference in probabilities (28.2 ppoints) to end up in the first quintile. As tracks with the other
results on inequality here, the standard error and resulting range from the rightmost columns indicate
much more variability for attaining the fifth quintile regardless of starting in the rich or poor quintile. This
adds to the evidence of the persistence of the poor to stay poor, and for even well-off individuals to face
more volatility that results in pointing them toward lower wealth quintiles.
Figure 15: First differences, top and bottom origin wealth
7.2.2 By skin tone
Finally, to understand to what extent skin tone is a conditioning factor, the same procedure as before is
followed: we will simulate 10,000 times the wealth outcome, but now for the differences resulting from
different skin tone groups by fixing being the light skin group as x, and x1 as being in the dark skin group.
The predicted probabilities for each, as well as the results of the simulation are as follows in Figure 16.
The distributions in red show the predicted and expected probabilities when fixing skin tone as light skin,
whereas those in blue show the probabilities when fixing it to dark skin.
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Figure 16: Predicted and expected probabilities, light and dark skin groups
The following table shows first differences for the light and dark skin groups. When conditioning
on being light skinned, there is more probability to attain the higher wealth status, for example 16.1%
probability to access the top quintile compared to 9.5% for dark skin.
There is a similar probability, around 28%, to end up in the middle quintile for both groups. So,
we see the differences demonstrate a baseline inequality between the two skin tone groups which is more
pronounced in the outcomes for the first and last quintiles.
Table 6: Expected probabilities, fixed skin tones and first differences
Quintile Probability Std. Error Lower (2.5%) Upper (97.5%)
Light Skin Group
Q1 0.106 0.003 0.099 0.112
Q2 0.209 0.023 0.167 0.258
Q3 0.286 0.023 0.238 0.329
Q4 0.238 0.011 0.211 0.255
Q5 0.161 0.039 0.094 0.247
Dark Skin Group
Q1 0.177 0.004 0.168 0.186
Q2 0.277 0.022 0.236 0.322
Q3 0.278 0.013 0.250 0.301
Q4 0.173 0.011 0.149 0.192
Q5 0.095 0.022 0.059 0.143
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Table 6 continued from previous page
Quintile Probability Std. Error Lower (2.5%) Upper (97.5%)
First Differences
Q1 0.071 0.006 0.060 0.082
Q2 0.069 0.004 0.061 0.076
Q3 -0.009 0.011 -0.029 0.012
Q4 -0.065 0.005 -0.074 -0.055
Q5 -0.066 0.017 -0.104 -0.036
These simulations show that parent wealth is a much stronger predictor for an individual’s current
wealth than that of skin tone alone. Still, we cannot diminish the notable (roughly 7 ppoint) difference
in probabilities for light skin to reinforce pigmentocracy mechanisms in catapulting individuals both out
of the lowest quintile and into the highest wealth quintile. Generational wealth standing generates more
differences in outcome to a much greater degree than skin tone, as the difference in probabilities of being
in the wealthiest quintile resulting from skin tone difference is expected to be 10.4% at most, while that
resulting of different origin wealth is expected at minimum 16.4%. Despite this trend overall, these variables
could be seen to influence inequality in similar ways: those with parents in the bottom quintile and those
in the dark-skinned group face under 10% probability to attain top quintile wealth.
Figure 17: First differences, light and dark skin groups
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8 Conclusions
In all, thorough analysis on the aspects of mobility in Mexico using 2016 MMSI data have shown fairly
consistent trends, most expected and others surprising. Survey responses evaluated individuals’ status and
also the self-reported one of their parents, thus allowing evaluation for intergenerational mobility; this lens
shows that many outcomes are highly dependent on circumstances, and that opportunity for advancement
can be considered an inheritance.
Constructing a material deprivation-based wealth index to resolve the problem of unavailable income
information (for both respondents and their parents), the population’s division into quintiles was critical
to see that both poor and rich status have degrees of persistence. Volatility was also seen throughout, in
that middle-class standing is much more likely to face a decline than a chance to advance.
In assessing the transition matrices for movement among categories of occupation, an interesting find-
ing was the long-run stochastic probability vector shows an eventually unbalanced population, with over
a quarter of the population working as officials, directors and chiefs, while only 4% of the population will
work in agriculture, forestry and fishing. We note that, despite the ever-present championing of upward
mobility, too much movement in a particular direction, as illustrated by occupational striving here, has
detrimental effects.
For educational attainment, it was found that, with a national average of 0.63, relative mobility is less
in rural areas (0.58) and dark skinned individuals (0.56). By absolute measures, given the average quartile
movement of 1.11 levels by national average, urban dwellers gain advantage (1.15 levels) and dark skin can
expect penalty (1.01). Those living in rural areas have four times less likelihood to reach a top education
level and are twice as likely, and notably higher than by any other disaggregation, to attain primary edu-
cation levels if their parents did; similar effects of persistence are seen in the dark-skinned group.
Ultimately these trends have consequences for Mexico, as emigration has reduced pressure on the Mex-
ican labor market, but the Mexican economy’s inability to create sufficient opportunities to retain its most
educated individuals may have a detrimental effect on long-term growth (Zúñiga and Molina 2008).
Analyzing these matrices for overall wealth yields similar results, characterized by persistence in the
poor, who have only a 3% chance to advance to the top, whereas it would be 20% if there was no evidence of
any initial advantages. While such jumps between extreme origin and destination quintiles are indeed rare
across countries, other so-called developed nations have benchmarks three or four times this rate. Light-
skinned individuals have the highest chances (57%) to hold onto high wealth status, compared to just
40% probability for dark skin and a stunning 29% for those in rural areas. There are notable differences
by region: the states of Nuevo León, Mexico City and Jalisco have much more mobility than Puebla,
Michoacán or Coahuila, and this effect could be seen as related to their urbanization.
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Urbanicity and indigenous tongue emerged as notably influencing explanatory variables in the ordered
logistic regression model. Living in a densely populated area is by far the most impactful (toward the pos-
itive), speaking an indigenous tongue negatively impacts outcomes and parent wealth does so positively.
From this, it is a given to conclude that opportunity does lie in cities, is predicated on generational wealth,
and disconnection from indigenous (commonly rural) lifestyle. It is interesting to note that difference for
gender was not significant for mobility here, though other research has much more to say on the matter;
we can assume that it doesn’t outweigh the importance of other factors in the model, which consistently
and dramatically impact mobility.
Beyond the results from the existing sample, the simulation that generalized the probabilities for mo-
bility was performed for general wealth quintile movement as well as conditioning on skin tone. The
probability distributions were more consistent for becoming poor than becoming rich, proving again that
upward mobility is an unstable target for the average Mexican. Movement into the extrema (poorest or
richest quintile) is more likely upward for light skin and, concurrently, less likely for dark skin. By this we
see reinforcement of the work of Pigmentocracy as developed by Telles and others.
In all, these various measures of mobility and opportunity paint a picture that personal progress in
Mexico is strongly tied to generational wealth, city living, and light skin. Payoffs from education are
overstated if conditioning on urbanicity and skin tone, corrupting traditional reasoning that education is
a way to lift the circumstances and outcomes of individuals. Besides, from 2000 to 2010 the amount of
Mexicans with advanced degrees has doubled, though this tracks exactly with an exponential growth of
those individuals to move out of the country in a ”brain drain.” The evidence by multiple mobility measures
show volatility in the middle class, narrow opportunity to advance significantly, and inequalities.
36
9 References
1. Alencar, E. & Ziegelmann, F. (2010). Estimation of Opportunity Inequality in Brazil using Nonpara-
metric Local Logistic Regression. The Journal of Development Studies.
2. Andersen, K. (2020). Evil Geniuses: The Unmaking of America: A Recent History.
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10 Appendix
Table A1: KMO and Bartlett Test - Origin Wealth Index
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy .928




Table A2: Total Variance Explained - Origin Wealth Index
Factor
Initial Eigenvalues
Total % of Variance Cumulative %
1 7.064 35.318 35.318
2 2.479 12.396 47.714
3 1.610 8.049 55.762
4 0.968 4.841 60.603
5 0.903 4.516 65.119
6 0.799 3.993 69.112
7 0.709 3.544 72.656
8 0.629 3.144 75.800
9 0.608 3.040 78.840
10 0.531 2.653 81.493
11 0.510 2.549 84.042
12 0.472 2.359 86.400
13 0.469 2.345 88.746
14 0.415 2.077 90.823
15 0.394 1.971 92.794
16 0.358 1.792 94.586
17 0.300 1.500 96.087
18 0.284 1.420 97.507
19 0.268 1.341 98.848
20 0.230 1.152 100
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Department store card 0.418
Second house 0.256
Land (not for agriculture) 0.047
Livestock -0.370
Land for agriculture -0.427
Work animals -0.448
Table A4: KMO and Bartlett Test - Current Wealth Index
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy .888




Table A5: Total Variance Explained - Current Wealth Index
Factor
Initial Eigenvalues
Total % of Variance Cumulative %
1 4.827 22.985 22.985
2 1.718 8.183 31.168
3 1.295 6.165 37.333
4 1.157 5.512 42.844
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Table A5 continued from previous page
Factor
Initial Eigenvalues
Total % of Variance Cumulative %
5 0.968 4.608 47.453
6 0.915 4.359 51.812
7 0.894 4.259 56.071
8 0.873 4.156 60.227
9 0.858 4.084 64.312
10 0.821 3.909 68.221
11 0.788 3.751 71.972
12 0.747 3.557 75.529
13 0.697 3.321 78.850
14 0.682 3.248 82.098
15 0.661 3.149 85.246
16 0.659 3.136 88.383
17 0.560 2.666 91.048
18 0.540 2.570 93.619
19 0.526 2.504 96.123
20 0.487 2.320 98.442
21 0.327 1.558 100























Land (not for agriculture) 0.094
Livestock -0.250
Land for agriculture -0.252
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